本文出自:http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/jw!9PlU5fyYGkMuLWrZg5sJ/article?mid=20033＆prev=20034＆next=20032＆l=a＆fid=13 網絡轉發,如有侵權,敬請告知刪除!
中翻越 女給男 ~謝絕google翻譯喔
7/9/2010 「「日本第一」力拚「世界第一」 Uniqlo要來了！」
「日本第一」力拚「世界第一」 Uniqlo要來了！
Uniqlo終於要來了，這家知名的日本平價時尚品牌，今秋即將進軍台灣。不只台灣，Uniqlo要走向海外，從亞洲到歐美，力拚世界第一，但開拓海外市場，挑戰比在日本國內大太多，Uniqlo的優勢甚至可能變成劣勢。
摘錄自：天下雜誌電子報%26nbsp; 2010/7/6
作者：經濟學人 出處：天下雜誌
基本款」──T恤、襪子、牛仔褲這些基本款服飾──通常不會是成衣業者眼中，最有商機的產品，但卻是每個人衣櫃裡必備衣著。
野心勃勃的日本成衣品牌優衣庫（Uniqlo），硬是有辦法把這些基本款變成賺錢的金礦，而且在稱霸日本市場後，正要展開征服全世界的新霸業。
把基本款變金礦
優衣庫的母公司迅銷集團（Fast Retailing）是日本最大的服裝零售商，今年總營收預估高達九十億美元。許多日本企業飽受國內經濟疲軟之苦，迅銷卻能一枝獨秀，在一片衰退中，去年營收逆勢成長了一七％。這麼亮眼的成績，說起來，也許該歸功於經濟不景氣，因為它的最大賣點，就是時尚與低價的結合。
迅銷被稱為是新一代、具有全球競爭力的日本企業代表，創辦人兼執行長柳井正從小服飾店老闆發跡，躍身成資產超過九十億美元的日本首富，而優衣庫也被品牌顧問公司Interbrand評選為日本前十大最有價值的品牌之一。
優衣庫的英文Uniqlo是原名unique clothing（獨特服裝）的縮寫，因為實在太「平價」，優衣庫的崛起，甚至被認為助長了日本這些年的通貨緊縮。
現在，優衣庫又瞄準海外市場，發動全球佈局攻勢，光是最近幾個月，就陸續在巴黎、莫斯科、上海等地開設旗艦店，而且都引來了大批顧客上門。
在中國開一千家分店
柳井希望在二○二○年前，達到營收五百億美元、獲利一百億美元的目標。目前，海外市場僅佔迅銷集團總營收的一成，但他預估，海外營收可望在二○一五年前，超越日本國內的業績。優衣庫在日本擁有將近八百家分店，在海外有一四○家，未來三～五年內，計劃每年展店五百家，而且大部份都會開在亞洲，特別是中國。目前它在中國已經有五十四家分店，將來打算擴充到一千家。
多年來，迅銷集團不靠購併，自然成長，但為了搶攻歐美市場，現在也不排除藉由收購來擴張。
柳井透露，未來準備斥資上百億美元進行收購，收購對象可以繼續保有原來的品牌，同時銷售部份的優衣庫服飾。不過，要找到合適的目標，並不容易。最近幾年，被迅銷收購的海外對象，都是小型品牌，包括法國流行女裝棉櫃子（Comptoir des Cotonniers）、休閒內衣品牌丹丹公主（Princesse Tam-Tam），以及美國紐約服裝品牌希爾瑞（Theory）等。
目前，迅銷集團的規模，仍然比不上全球三大平價服飾業龍頭──美國的Gap、瑞典的H%26M、西班牙的Inditex（Zara母公司）──它的營收最多只有這些巨擘的三分之二。（見表）
但迅銷正在快速追趕，幾年前還曾經創下爆炸性成長的紀錄：二○○六年，柳井誇口要在二○一○年，讓營收翻兩番，從三十五億衝上百億美元，當時很多分析師都說他在作夢，然而，迅銷今年的業績證明，柳井就快要達到目標。
不僅如此，迅銷還以一套獨特的經營模式，與其他業者相抗衡。
Zara、H%26M等品牌的策略，是快速推出最新流行的時尚服飾，一年內不斷有各種新系列上市。而迅銷的做法截然不同，它的商品品項大約只有一千件，遠低於對手，上架銷售的時間也比較久。
一款襪子，五十種顏色
「我們並不想追逐『快速時尚』（fast fashion），」柳井指出。
為了彌補品項上的差距，優衣庫祭出了色彩戰術：同款商品有多種繽紛的顏色，供人挑選，例如在東京旗艦店裡，一款襪子可以有多達五十種顏色任你挑。優衣庫認為，這種兼顧實用與多樣的基本款商品，比起Gap的美式學院風、Zara與H%26M的流行時尚風，優勢在於：可以吸引更廣的顧客群。
一九八四年，第一家優衣庫專門店在廣島開幕，但卻是到了一九九○年代初，日本經濟進入「失落的十年」，生意才開始起飛。柳井跳過了中間商，直接向供應商下訂單，而且大膽挑戰「日本消費者不會接受中國製成衣」的業界看法。今天，優衣庫有高達九成的產品，都是在中國製造。
不過，征戰海外市場，優衣庫以往在國內的成功因素，恐怕都派不上用場。
征戰海外的新考驗
過去，優衣庫拜日本經濟不景氣、消費者精打細算之賜而崛起，但現在要搶攻的新興市場，經濟卻欣欣向榮，民眾樂得花錢血拚。
其次，優衣庫在日本採取「從郊區包圍市區」的策略，分店大多開在小鎮。但他們在英國、美國的郊區試點後，發現成效奇慘，只好調整策略，改在海外市場的繁華都會區，開設大型專門店。
另外，賣基本款起家的優衣庫，現在也開始增添較有流行感的系列服飾，例如去年與德國設計師吉兒．珊德（Jil Sander）合作推出的新品。未來，它必須開始管理多文化、多語言的員工，但是日本企業在這方面，大多不在行。而它的商品必須根據各地市場的喜好，逐一調整，原先享有的規模優勢，也勢必將受到影響。
「優勢有時會變成劣勢，」柳井坦承，「基本款也可能讓人覺得無聊。」
柳井自己，也是個問題。迅銷集團的主管形容他們的老闆，對於流行時尚的判斷力奇佳，是非常厲害的策略制定者，但就是無法授權，喜歡決策一把抓，連看打樣、挑顏色這些瑣事，他都要自己來。「優秀的管理者，必須注重細節，」柳井這麼解釋。
事必躬親，接班人選難產
這種事必躬親的管理作風，導致有能力的主管紛紛求去，讓柳井的接班人選難產。現年六十一歲的柳井，原本計劃在六十五歲卸下執行長的職務，幾年前也曾經退居二線，但後來還是無法放手，再度復出。
不過，柳井強調，他已經決定不交棒給自己的兩個兒子；他們會成為握有董事席次的大股東，但不會掌握經營權。
向來勇於打破陳規的柳井，這個「不傳子」的決定，再度顛覆了日本企業的傳統。他認為，由長子繼承經營權的企業，後來的表現都很差。但話說回來，長期仰賴一個強人領導的企業，如果找不到人才接班，後果恐怕也不會太好。（吳怡靜譯）
經濟學人英文原文
The Economist
Uniqlo
By THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
From The Economist
Published: June 30, 2010
BASICS—everyday items such as T-shirts, socks and jeans, in the jargon of the garment industry—are not normally considered the most exciting part of the business. But they are found in almost every wardrobe. Uniqlo, a successful Japanese firm with big ambitions, has transformed them into a goldmine. Having conquered Japan, it is now taking on the world.
Uniqlo%26#39;s parent company, Fast Retailing, is Japan%26#39;s biggest clothing company, with sales of $9 billion forecast this year. Whereas many Japanese businesses are ailing because of the stagnant domestic economy, Fast Retailing is flourishing. Last year sales grew by 17%, despite the recession, or because of it: its clothes combine a touch of style with enticingly low prices.
The company is hailed as an example of a new, globally competitive Japan. Its founder and boss, Tadashi Yanai, emerged from humble origins to become Japan%26#39;s richest man, worth over $9 billion. Uniqlo ranks among Japan%26#39;s ten most valuable brands, according to Interbrand, a consultancy. Its low prices are even blamed for fuelling Japan%26#39;s deflation.
Now Uniqlo, whose name is a contraction of "unique clothing", is on the move. In recent months it has opened huge flagship stores in Paris, Moscow and Shanghai, which have been met with throngs of customers. Mr Yanai wants $50 billion in sales and $10 billion in profit by 2020. Although only 10% of Fast Retailing%26#39;s sales come from abroad, Mr Yanai expects overseas revenue to surpass domestic sales by 2015. And although it boasts around 800 stores in Japan and 140 overseas, it plans to open a staggering 500 new stores annually over the next three to five years. Most will be in Asia, notably China, where it already has 54 shops but wants to have 1,000.
Fast Retailing prefers to grow independently, but is also open to expansion by acquisition to enhance the firm%26#39;s presence in America or Europe. A future bride, says Mr Yanai, could retain its own identity while selling some of Uniqlo%26#39;s clothes, and could cost as much as $10 billion. But finding the right firm is difficult, he says. In recent years, Fast Retailing has successfully acquired smaller foreign brands including France%26#39;s Comptoir des Cotonniers for women%26#39;s wear and Princesse Tam-Tam lingerie, as well as America%26#39;s Theory.
Fast Retailing is still smaller than its global peers. Its revenue is around two-thirds that of America%26#39;s Gap, Sweden%26#39;s Hennes %26 Mauritz (H%26M) and Spain%26#39;s Inditex, which runs the Zara chain (see chart). But Fast Retailing is catching up fast, and has a record of startlingly rapid growth. When Mr Yanai declared in 2006 that its sales would rise from $3.5 billion to $10 billion this year, analysts derided him, but the firm is very close to the target.
Fast Retailing also has a distinctive business model. Zara and H%26M bring the latest fashions to the masses quickly, ordering new lines many times a year. Fast Retailing, by contrast, sells only around 1,000 items, far fewer than its rivals, and keeps them on the shelves longer. "We don%26#39;t want to chase after ‘fast-fashion%26#39; trends," explains Mr Yanai. This lets Fast Retailing strike lower-priced, higher-volume deals with suppliers (most products cost $10-20) and makes managing inventory a much simpler and cheaper affair.
Uniqlo makes up for the narrowness of its offering by selling the same item in many colours: socks come in 50 hues at its flagship store in Tokyo. Such basics, the firm believes, have the added benefit of appealing to a wider audience than the preppy Americana sold by Gap or the faddish wares of Inditex and H%26M.
Although it opened its first store in 1984, Uniqlo really got going in the early 1990s, just as Japan was entering a long period of economic anaemia. Mr Yanai bypassed middlemen by purchasing directly from suppliers. And he challenged the view that Japanese consumers would reject Chinese-made clothes (90% of its apparel is made in China).
But the factors behind Uniqlo%26#39;s domestic success are of little avail as it expands abroad. The belt-tightening environment in which it flourished does not pertain in many of the emerging markets it is targeting, although it certainly does in most of the rich world. Uniqlo relies mainly on small suburban shops in Japan but is opening giant stores in posh central locations overseas. (Experiments with suburban shops in Britain and America have gone badly.) Moreover, Uniqlo succeeded in basics but is now expanding into trendier lines, for example through a tie-up with Jil Sander, a German fashion designer. It will have to manage a multicultural, multilingual workforce—an area where Japanese firms often trip up. And merchandise will need to be tailored to national tastes, so scale will be harder to achieve. "One%26#39;s strength can be one%26#39;s weakness: basics can be boring," Mr Yanai admits.
Mr Yanai himself may also create problems. A brilliant strategist with uncanny fashion instincts, he is also unable to delegate, say Fast Retailing executives. He controls all decisions, down to approving samples and colours. Mr Yanai defends his meddling. "A good business manager", he says, must "pay attention to the details."
This micromanaging has pushed talented executives to quit the firm, leaving no obvious successor to Mr Yanai, who plans to step down as boss (but remain chairman) in four years, at 65. Previous attempts to cede day-to-day control have been aborted.
When pressed, Mr Yanai says that he has decided not to hand the company over to his sons. They will be big shareholders with board seats, but will not take operational roles. In this, he once again defies traditional Japanese business practices. Firms that rely on primogeniture, he notes, perform poorly. So, in the long run, do those that rely on a domineering leader.
中翻越 女給男 ~謝絕google翻譯喔
7/9/2010 「「日本第一」力拚「世界第一」 Uniqlo要來了！」
「日本第一」力拚「世界第一」 Uniqlo要來了！
Uniqlo終於要來了，這家知名的日本平價時尚品牌，今秋即將進軍台灣。不只台灣，Uniqlo要走向海外，從亞洲到歐美，力拚世界第一，但開拓海外市場，挑戰比在日本國內大太多，Uniqlo的優勢甚至可能變成劣勢。
摘錄自：天下雜誌電子報%26nbsp; 2010/7/6
作者：經濟學人 出處：天下雜誌
基本款」──T恤、襪子、牛仔褲這些基本款服飾──通常不會是成衣業者眼中，最有商機的產品，但卻是每個人衣櫃裡必備衣著。
野心勃勃的日本成衣品牌優衣庫（Uniqlo），硬是有辦法把這些基本款變成賺錢的金礦，而且在稱霸日本市場後，正要展開征服全世界的新霸業。
把基本款變金礦
優衣庫的母公司迅銷集團（Fast Retailing）是日本最大的服裝零售商，今年總營收預估高達九十億美元。許多日本企業飽受國內經濟疲軟之苦，迅銷卻能一枝獨秀，在一片衰退中，去年營收逆勢成長了一七％。這麼亮眼的成績，說起來，也許該歸功於經濟不景氣，因為它的最大賣點，就是時尚與低價的結合。
迅銷被稱為是新一代、具有全球競爭力的日本企業代表，創辦人兼執行長柳井正從小服飾店老闆發跡，躍身成資產超過九十億美元的日本首富，而優衣庫也被品牌顧問公司Interbrand評選為日本前十大最有價值的品牌之一。
優衣庫的英文Uniqlo是原名unique clothing（獨特服裝）的縮寫，因為實在太「平價」，優衣庫的崛起，甚至被認為助長了日本這些年的通貨緊縮。
現在，優衣庫又瞄準海外市場，發動全球佈局攻勢，光是最近幾個月，就陸續在巴黎、莫斯科、上海等地開設旗艦店，而且都引來了大批顧客上門。
在中國開一千家分店
柳井希望在二○二○年前，達到營收五百億美元、獲利一百億美元的目標。目前，海外市場僅佔迅銷集團總營收的一成，但他預估，海外營收可望在二○一五年前，超越日本國內的業績。優衣庫在日本擁有將近八百家分店，在海外有一四○家，未來三～五年內，計劃每年展店五百家，而且大部份都會開在亞洲，特別是中國。目前它在中國已經有五十四家分店，將來打算擴充到一千家。
多年來，迅銷集團不靠購併，自然成長，但為了搶攻歐美市場，現在也不排除藉由收購來擴張。
柳井透露，未來準備斥資上百億美元進行收購，收購對象可以繼續保有原來的品牌，同時銷售部份的優衣庫服飾。不過，要找到合適的目標，並不容易。最近幾年，被迅銷收購的海外對象，都是小型品牌，包括法國流行女裝棉櫃子（Comptoir des Cotonniers）、休閒內衣品牌丹丹公主（Princesse Tam-Tam），以及美國紐約服裝品牌希爾瑞（Theory）等。
目前，迅銷集團的規模，仍然比不上全球三大平價服飾業龍頭──美國的Gap、瑞典的H%26M、西班牙的Inditex（Zara母公司）──它的營收最多只有這些巨擘的三分之二。（見表）
但迅銷正在快速追趕，幾年前還曾經創下爆炸性成長的紀錄：二○○六年，柳井誇口要在二○一○年，讓營收翻兩番，從三十五億衝上百億美元，當時很多分析師都說他在作夢，然而，迅銷今年的業績證明，柳井就快要達到目標。
不僅如此，迅銷還以一套獨特的經營模式，與其他業者相抗衡。
Zara、H%26M等品牌的策略，是快速推出最新流行的時尚服飾，一年內不斷有各種新系列上市。而迅銷的做法截然不同，它的商品品項大約只有一千件，遠低於對手，上架銷售的時間也比較久。
一款襪子，五十種顏色
「我們並不想追逐『快速時尚』（fast fashion），」柳井指出。
為了彌補品項上的差距，優衣庫祭出了色彩戰術：同款商品有多種繽紛的顏色，供人挑選，例如在東京旗艦店裡，一款襪子可以有多達五十種顏色任你挑。優衣庫認為，這種兼顧實用與多樣的基本款商品，比起Gap的美式學院風、Zara與H%26M的流行時尚風，優勢在於：可以吸引更廣的顧客群。
一九八四年，第一家優衣庫專門店在廣島開幕，但卻是到了一九九○年代初，日本經濟進入「失落的十年」，生意才開始起飛。柳井跳過了中間商，直接向供應商下訂單，而且大膽挑戰「日本消費者不會接受中國製成衣」的業界看法。今天，優衣庫有高達九成的產品，都是在中國製造。
不過，征戰海外市場，優衣庫以往在國內的成功因素，恐怕都派不上用場。
征戰海外的新考驗
過去，優衣庫拜日本經濟不景氣、消費者精打細算之賜而崛起，但現在要搶攻的新興市場，經濟卻欣欣向榮，民眾樂得花錢血拚。
其次，優衣庫在日本採取「從郊區包圍市區」的策略，分店大多開在小鎮。但他們在英國、美國的郊區試點後，發現成效奇慘，只好調整策略，改在海外市場的繁華都會區，開設大型專門店。
另外，賣基本款起家的優衣庫，現在也開始增添較有流行感的系列服飾，例如去年與德國設計師吉兒．珊德（Jil Sander）合作推出的新品。未來，它必須開始管理多文化、多語言的員工，但是日本企業在這方面，大多不在行。而它的商品必須根據各地市場的喜好，逐一調整，原先享有的規模優勢，也勢必將受到影響。
「優勢有時會變成劣勢，」柳井坦承，「基本款也可能讓人覺得無聊。」
柳井自己，也是個問題。迅銷集團的主管形容他們的老闆，對於流行時尚的判斷力奇佳，是非常厲害的策略制定者，但就是無法授權，喜歡決策一把抓，連看打樣、挑顏色這些瑣事，他都要自己來。「優秀的管理者，必須注重細節，」柳井這麼解釋。
事必躬親，接班人選難產
這種事必躬親的管理作風，導致有能力的主管紛紛求去，讓柳井的接班人選難產。現年六十一歲的柳井，原本計劃在六十五歲卸下執行長的職務，幾年前也曾經退居二線，但後來還是無法放手，再度復出。
不過，柳井強調，他已經決定不交棒給自己的兩個兒子；他們會成為握有董事席次的大股東，但不會掌握經營權。
向來勇於打破陳規的柳井，這個「不傳子」的決定，再度顛覆了日本企業的傳統。他認為，由長子繼承經營權的企業，後來的表現都很差。但話說回來，長期仰賴一個強人領導的企業，如果找不到人才接班，後果恐怕也不會太好。（吳怡靜譯）
經濟學人英文原文
The Economist
Uniqlo
By THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
From The Economist
Published: June 30, 2010
BASICS—everyday items such as T-shirts, socks and jeans, in the jargon of the garment industry—are not normally considered the most exciting part of the business. But they are found in almost every wardrobe. Uniqlo, a successful Japanese firm with big ambitions, has transformed them into a goldmine. Having conquered Japan, it is now taking on the world.
Uniqlo%26#39;s parent company, Fast Retailing, is Japan%26#39;s biggest clothing company, with sales of $9 billion forecast this year. Whereas many Japanese businesses are ailing because of the stagnant domestic economy, Fast Retailing is flourishing. Last year sales grew by 17%, despite the recession, or because of it: its clothes combine a touch of style with enticingly low prices.
The company is hailed as an example of a new, globally competitive Japan. Its founder and boss, Tadashi Yanai, emerged from humble origins to become Japan%26#39;s richest man, worth over $9 billion. Uniqlo ranks among Japan%26#39;s ten most valuable brands, according to Interbrand, a consultancy. Its low prices are even blamed for fuelling Japan%26#39;s deflation.
Now Uniqlo, whose name is a contraction of "unique clothing", is on the move. In recent months it has opened huge flagship stores in Paris, Moscow and Shanghai, which have been met with throngs of customers. Mr Yanai wants $50 billion in sales and $10 billion in profit by 2020. Although only 10% of Fast Retailing%26#39;s sales come from abroad, Mr Yanai expects overseas revenue to surpass domestic sales by 2015. And although it boasts around 800 stores in Japan and 140 overseas, it plans to open a staggering 500 new stores annually over the next three to five years. Most will be in Asia, notably China, where it already has 54 shops but wants to have 1,000.
Fast Retailing prefers to grow independently, but is also open to expansion by acquisition to enhance the firm%26#39;s presence in America or Europe. A future bride, says Mr Yanai, could retain its own identity while selling some of Uniqlo%26#39;s clothes, and could cost as much as $10 billion. But finding the right firm is difficult, he says. In recent years, Fast Retailing has successfully acquired smaller foreign brands including France%26#39;s Comptoir des Cotonniers for women%26#39;s wear and Princesse Tam-Tam lingerie, as well as America%26#39;s Theory.
Fast Retailing is still smaller than its global peers. Its revenue is around two-thirds that of America%26#39;s Gap, Sweden%26#39;s Hennes %26 Mauritz (H%26M) and Spain%26#39;s Inditex, which runs the Zara chain (see chart). But Fast Retailing is catching up fast, and has a record of startlingly rapid growth. When Mr Yanai declared in 2006 that its sales would rise from $3.5 billion to $10 billion this year, analysts derided him, but the firm is very close to the target.
Fast Retailing also has a distinctive business model. Zara and H%26M bring the latest fashions to the masses quickly, ordering new lines many times a year. Fast Retailing, by contrast, sells only around 1,000 items, far fewer than its rivals, and keeps them on the shelves longer. "We don%26#39;t want to chase after ‘fast-fashion%26#39; trends," explains Mr Yanai. This lets Fast Retailing strike lower-priced, higher-volume deals with suppliers (most products cost $10-20) and makes managing inventory a much simpler and cheaper affair.
Uniqlo makes up for the narrowness of its offering by selling the same item in many colours: socks come in 50 hues at its flagship store in Tokyo. Such basics, the firm believes, have the added benefit of appealing to a wider audience than the preppy Americana sold by Gap or the faddish wares of Inditex and H%26M.
Although it opened its first store in 1984, Uniqlo really got going in the early 1990s, just as Japan was entering a long period of economic anaemia. Mr Yanai bypassed middlemen by purchasing directly from suppliers. And he challenged the view that Japanese consumers would reject Chinese-made clothes (90% of its apparel is made in China).
But the factors behind Uniqlo%26#39;s domestic success are of little avail as it expands abroad. The belt-tightening environment in which it flourished does not pertain in many of the emerging markets it is targeting, although it certainly does in most of the rich world. Uniqlo relies mainly on small suburban shops in Japan but is opening giant stores in posh central locations overseas. (Experiments with suburban shops in Britain and America have gone badly.) Moreover, Uniqlo succeeded in basics but is now expanding into trendier lines, for example through a tie-up with Jil Sander, a German fashion designer. It will have to manage a multicultural, multilingual workforce—an area where Japanese firms often trip up. And merchandise will need to be tailored to national tastes, so scale will be harder to achieve. "One%26#39;s strength can be one%26#39;s weakness: basics can be boring," Mr Yanai admits.
Mr Yanai himself may also create problems. A brilliant strategist with uncanny fashion instincts, he is also unable to delegate, say Fast Retailing executives. He controls all decisions, down to approving samples and colours. Mr Yanai defends his meddling. "A good business manager", he says, must "pay attention to the details."
This micromanaging has pushed talented executives to quit the firm, leaving no obvious successor to Mr Yanai, who plans to step down as boss (but remain chairman) in four years, at 65. Previous attempts to cede day-to-day control have been aborted.
When pressed, Mr Yanai says that he has decided not to hand the company over to his sons. They will be big shareholders with board seats, but will not take operational roles. In this, he once again defies traditional Japanese business practices. Firms that rely on primogeniture, he notes, perform poorly. So, in the long run, do those that rely on a domineering leader.
請先 登入 以發表留言。